The Ice Center of Washington West, Inc v. Town of Waterbury (2007-265)
2008 VT 37
[Filed 26-Mar-2008]
|
SUPREME COURT
DOCKET NO. 2007-265
|
|
|
|
MARCH TERM, 2008
|
|
The Ice Center
of Washington West, Inc.
|
}
|
APPEALED FROM:
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
v.
|
}
|
Washington Superior Court
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
Town of Waterbury
and State of Vermont
|
}
|
DOCKET NO. 595-10-06
Wncv
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Trial Judge: Mary Miles Teachout
|
In the above-entitled
cause, the Clerk will enter:
¶ 1.
Plaintiff, the Ice Center of Washington West, Inc., appeals from a grant
of summary judgment for defendants, the Town of Waterbury
and the State of Vermont.
We affirm.
¶ 2.
The Ice Center
is a Vermont nonprofit corporation that was
formed to construct and operate an indoor ice rink in Waterbury, Vermont.
The Ice Center is used primarily by school
hockey players and skaters for practices and games. Twelve local
schools use the Ice
Center. After
treating the Ice Center
as tax exempt for several years, the Town of Waterbury,
following instructions from the Vermont Department of Taxes, sent a notice of a
change of appraisal to plaintiff in 2006 indicating its intent to remove the Ice Center’s
tax-exempt status. Subsequently, the Ice Center
petitioned the Washington Superior Court, seeking a declaration of its rights
and obligations relating to the taxability of its land and premises and relief
from its pending tax bill. 12 V.S.A. § 4711 (courts shall have power to declare
rights, status, and other legal relations).
¶ 3.
The State moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Ice Center is a
“community recreational facility” and therefore is not exempt from property
taxes under 32 V.S.A. § 3832(7), unless so voted by the municipality.
The Ice Center cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing that its primary
purpose is educational and that it is therefore tax-exempt under 32 V.S.A.
§ 3802(4). The superior court granted defendant’s motion and
denied the Ice Center’s. The court found that the
Ice Center is primarily dedicated to
recreational activity and thus, that § 3832(7) applied. The
court concluded that the Ice
Center could not be
tax-exempt under § 3802(4).
¶ 4.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standard as the trial court. Burr & Burton
Seminary v. Town of Manchester, 172 Vt. 433, 435, 782 A.2d
1149, 1151 (2001). Summary judgment is proper where there is no
genuine issue of material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. V.R.C.P. 56(c)(3). A tax exemption
is strictly construed against the taxpayer, “and any doubts as to its
application will be interpreted against the exemption.” Am.
Museum of Fly Fishing, Inc. v. Town of
Manchester, 151 Vt. 103, 108, 557 A.2d 900, 903 (1989).
¶ 5.
The Ice Center argues that it is exempt from
property tax under subsection (4) of § 3802, which applies generally to
“real and personal estate granted, sequestered or used for public, pious or
charitable uses.” The subsection exempts certain uses such as churches,
libraries, colleges, academies, or other public schools. Any exemption
available under § 3802(4) is limited by § 3832(7), and the taxpayer
has a double burden: first, to prove exemption under § 3802(4); and second,
to show that the exemption is not limited by § 3832(7). In re
Aloha Found., Inc., 134 Vt. 239, 240, 360 A.2d 74, 75-76
(1976). If subsection (7) applies, “there can
be no tax exemption without a vote of the town concerned.” Id. at 240, 360 A.2d at 76.
¶ 6.
The superior court decided this
case under § 3832(7) and did not reach the Ice Center’s
claims regarding § 3802(4). Section 3832 provides:
The exemption from taxation of
real and personal estate granted, sequestered or used for public, pious or
charitable uses shall not be construed as exempting:
…
(7) Real and personal property
of an organization when the property is used primarily for health or
recreational purposes, unless the town or municipality in which the property is
located so votes at any regular or special meeting duly warned therefor.
32 V.S.A. §
3832(7).
¶ 7.
When construing a statute, our primary objective is to effectuate the
intent of the Legislature. In re S. Burlington-Shelburne Highway Project,
174 Vt. 604,
605, 817 A.2d 49, 51 (2002) (mem.). Our
first step is to look to the language of the statute itself; we presume the
Legislature intended the plain, ordinary meaning of the language. Burlington Elec. Dep’t v. Vt. Dep’t of
Taxes, 154 Vt.
332, 335, 576 A.2d 450, 452 (1990). When
the plain language is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry is at an end, and we
enforce the statute according to its terms. State
v. Eldredge, 2006 VT 80, ¶ 7, 180 Vt. 278, 910 A.2d 816.
¶ 8.
The Ice
Center concedes that it
“is a community recreational facility.” The Ice Center’s
mission statement states that the facility offers “constructive recreational
choices.” On appeal, the Ice Center
does not argue that the facility is not recreational. Instead, the Ice Center
posits that because 75% of the use comes from schools and their students, the
recreational nature of the facility is outweighed by an educational purpose
sufficient to avoid § 3832(7)’s limitation. We agree with the
superior court that the facility is primarily dedicated to recreation.
Ice skating and extracurricular activities based on ice skating, such as
hockey, are traditionally considered to be recreational in nature. The
fact that the facility may be primarily used by schools and their students,
while true in this case, is also true of most recreational facilities and is
not per se indicative of an educational purpose. See President &
Fellows of Middlebury College v. Town of Hancock, 147 Vt. 259, 261, 514 A.2d 1061, 1063 (1986)
(holding that college ski area is primarily recreational and thus not tax
exempt under § 3832(7)). Moreover, while the users of the Ice Center
may derive some educational value from hockey and skating, most recreational
activities have similar benefits. While ardent hockey fans might
disagree, we see no reason, and plaintiff offers none, to conclude that hockey
and skating are more educational than other recreational activities, and thus
decline to adopt plaintiff’s construction of § 3832(7)’s limitations. Therefore, even if the Ice Center
cleared the hurdle of § 3802(4), an exemption would still be unavailable
under § 3832(7).
¶ 9.
The Ice
Center also asserts that
because the rink would not be taxed if it were owned by the school district or
the town, it should not be taxed when owned by a nonprofit corporation.
This argument is unavailing. The decision to distinguish between
municipally owned facilities and privately owned facilities when granting tax
exemptions is a political one made by the Legislature. In this case, the
Legislature expressly created this distinction. The statute allows towns
to exempt from property tax privately owned recreational facilities through
town vote. According to plaintiff, Waterbury
has not held such a vote because it wants to avoid having to pay the
educational property tax that would result from an exemption. Here, the Legislature’s clear
intent, evidenced by the plain language of § 3832(7), was to exclude from tax
exemption facilities primarily dedicated to recreation. The Ice Center,
being primarily recreational, is not exempt from property tax unless and until
the required vote occurs. Any change to the existing statutes is, of
course, within the sole province of the Legislature.
¶ 10.
Finally, plaintiff requests this Court
to consider a partial tax exemption. Because 75% of the Ice Center’s
use is school-related, it urges this Court to grant at least a 75% property tax
exemption. This issue was not raised with the superior court, and we do
not consider it. USGen New
England, Inc. v. Town of Rockingham, 2003 VT 102, ¶ 39, 176 Vt. 104, 838 A.2d
927.
Affirmed.
|
|
BY THE COURT:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Paul L. Reiber,
Chief Justice
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Denise R. Johnson,
Associate Justice
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Brian L. Burgess, Associate
Justice
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Brian Grearson,
District Judge,
Specially Assigned
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Walter M. Morris, Jr.,
District Judge,
Specially Assigned
|